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Abstract
This paper considers the impact of investment cost asymmetry on the
value and optimal real option exercise strategies of ¯rms under imperfect
competition. Both ¯rms have an opportunity to invest in a project en-
hancing (ceteris paribus) the pro¯t °ow. We show that three types of
equilibria exist and derive critical levels of cost asymmetry separating the
regions in which they prevail. The presence of strategic interactions leads
to counter-intuitive results. First, depending on the level of asymmetry, a
marginal increase in the investment cost of the ¯rm with the cost disad-
vantage can increase this ¯rm's own value. Second, such a cost increase
can result in a decrease in value of the competitor. Moreover, we dis-
cuss the welfare implications of the optimal exercise strategies and show
that the presence of identical ¯rms can result in a socially less desirable
outcome than if one of the competitors has a signi¯cant investment cost
disadvantage. Finally, we prove that pro¯t uncertainty always delays in-
vestment, even in the presence of a strategic option of becoming the ¯rst
investor.
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11 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to study the e®ects of imperfect competition on
the optimal real option exercise strategies in a situation where the costs of
exercising options di®er among ¯rms. The need for a separate treatment of
real, as opposed to ¯nancial, options results from the non-exclusivity of the
former. In particular, the optimal exercise decision of a ¯rm competing in an
oligopolistic market depends not only on the value of the underlying process
but also on the actions undertaken by its competitor(s) (cf. Zingales [22]). For
example, the investment opportunity to set up the production line of personal
cars in place of the existing assembly line may be represented as a real option
to exchange a ¯xed amount of money for an incremental stream of uncertain
cash °ows. The cost of launching the production net of the scrap value of
the assembly line can be viewed as the strike price of the option, whereas the
increase in the expected present value of the stochastic pro¯t °ow corresponds
to the underlying asset. The value of the investment opportunity, as well as
the optimal exercise strategy associated with it, highly depends on the actions
taken by the competing car manufacturer. Consequently, neither the value of
the ¯rm nor the optimal exercise strategy resembles any longer the situation
where the ¯rm has an exclusive option to invest.
The last decade's research results in a number of contributions dealing
with the non-exclusivity of real options. The basic continuous-time model of
strategic real option exercise under product market competition is presented
by Smets [18]. He considers a duopolistic ¯rm's decision to (costly) switch the
production from a developed to an emerging economy where production costs
are lower. Applications and extensions of the strategic real option exercise
model include Grenadier [5], [6], Williams [21], Lambrecht and Perraudin [12],
D¶ ecamps and Mariotti [2], Perotti and Rossetto [16], and Mason and Weeds
[15], whereas Reinganum [17], and Fudenberg and Tirole [4] provide the game-
theoretical foundations within a deterministic framework.1
In this paper we analyze the situation where two ¯rms have an op-
portunity to invest in a pro¯t enhancing investment project and face di®erent
(e®ective) investment costs. This framework, which allows for a departure from
the unrealistic assumption that the duopolistic rivals are identical, re°ects a
number of factors.2 First, investment cost asymmetry is present when the ¯rms
have a di®erent access to the capital markets. In such a case, the cost of capital
of a liquidity-constrained ¯rm is higher than of its counterpart with an access
to a credit line or with substantial cash reserves (Lensink, Bo and Sterken [13]).
Consequently, the investment cost of the ¯rm facing capital market imperfec-
tions is higher as well. Moreover, cost asymmetry occurs when the ¯rms exhibit
a di®erent degree of organizational °exibility at implementing a new produc-
tion technology. This °exibility, known as absorptive capacity (cf. Cohen and
1The discrete time analysis of a strategic options exercise is presented, among others, by
Smit and Ankum [19], and Kulatilaka and Perotti [11].
2It is expected that other forms of asymmetry (such as pro¯tability of the project, pro¯t
uncertainty characteristics etc.) lead to similar results.
2Levintal [1]), measures the ¯rm's ability toadopt external technologies, toassim-
ilate to a changing economic environment, and to commercialize newly invented
products. A higher absorptive capacity is therefore equivalent to a lower cost
associated with an investment project. Di®ering real options embedded in the
existing assets of the ¯rms are another source of the investment cost asymme-
try. This re°ects the possibility that the ¯rms currently exploit two di®erent
but equally e±cient technologies. After an arrival of a new invention it may
appear that one of the existing technologies is more easily extendable than the
other. Finally, the di®erence in the investment costs is often a consequence of
purely exogenous factors, resulting e.g. from di®erent regulation. Those legal
and ¯scal factors are discussed later in the section concerning social welfare.
We consider the optimal real option exercise strategy of duopolistic
¯rms already competing in a product market. Both ¯rms have an investment
opportunity enhancing (ceteris paribus) the pro¯t °ow. If one ¯rm invests,
the other ¯rm's payo® is reduced. This is, for example, the case when the
investment gives the ¯rm the possibility to produce more e±ciently and thus
cheaper, which leads to a higher market share. The ¯rms di®er ex ante only
with respect to the required sunk cost associated with the investment. Our
framework most directly generalizes Smets [18] and Grenadier [5], who restrict
the analysis to a game between symmetric ¯rms and of Huisman and Nielsen
[10], who consider a new market entry of asymmetric ¯rms. This generalization
results in the presence of three di®erent equilibrium strategies. First, when the
asymmetry among ¯rms is relatively small and so is the ¯rst-mover advantage,
the ¯rms invest jointly. When the ¯rst-mover advantage is su±ciently large, the
lower-cost ¯rm preempts the higher-cost ¯rm. In the situation where both the
¯rst-mover advantage and asymmetry between ¯rms are signi¯cant, the ¯rms
exercise their investment options sequentially and their investment timing do
not a®ect each other directly. The two latter equilibria are also present in Perotti
and Rossetto [16].
Subsequently, we determine the ¯rms' values and present welfare impli-
cations of the strategic option exercise. We ¯nd that, when an increase in the
investment expenditure of the higher-cost ¯rm results in a switch from joint in-
vestment to preemption equilibrium, the value of both ¯rms decrease. Moreover,
in a preemption equilibrium, an increase in the higher-cost ¯rm's investment
expenditure results in increasing its value due to its commitment not to invest
before the market is su±ciently large. Then the low cost ¯rm knows that it
could delay the investment without bearing the risk of being preempted. This
investment delay raises the value of the higher cost ¯rm. Using an example of a
duopoly in which after the investment the ¯rms can o®er a good with a higher
quality, we show the relationship between the type of equilibrium and the level
of consumer surplus. This analysis indicates that an equal access of competitors
to a new technology (or a new market) may not be socially optimal. Finally,
we analyze the impact of uncertainty on the optimal investment thresholds. We
¯nd that the value of waiting option increases in the pro¯t volatility despite the
presence of strategic interactions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model.
3Section 3 contains the derivation of value functions and optimal investment
thresholds. The discussion of the resulting equilibrium strategies is presented in
Section 4 and the analysis of the impact of strategic interactions on the value of
the ¯rms is included in Section 5. In Section 6 we analyze the relationship be-
tween ¯rms' investment strategies and social welfare whereas Section 7 discusses
the impact of uncertainty on the timing of investment. Section 8 concludes.
2 Framework of the Model
Essentially, the basic framework of the non-strategic model of McDonald
and Siegel [14] is adapted here, with the di®erence that we consider two ¯rms
rather than one. The two ¯rms are risk neutral, compete in the product market,
and realize a non-negative stochastic pro¯t °ow.3 The uncertainty in each of the
¯rms' pro¯ts is introduced via a geometric Brownian motion x = fxt : t ¸ 0g
such that
dxt = ®xtdt + ¾xtdwt; (1)
where ® and ¾ are constants corresponding to the instantaneous drift and,
respectively, to the instantaneous standard deviation, dt is the time increment
and dwt is the Wiener increment. In order to obtain ¯nite valuations, we impose
® < r, where r is a risk-free rate. The uncertainty in the pro¯t function is
included in a multiplicative way. The instantaneous pro¯t of Firm i can be
expressed as
¼t;NiNj = xtDNiNj; (2)
where, for i;j 2 f0;1g; i 6= j :
Ni =
½
0 if ¯rm i has not invested,
1 if ¯rm i has invested.





D10 > D00 implies that the pro¯t of the ¯rm that invests as ¯rst exceeds ceteris
paribus the initial (symmetric) pro¯t. Moreover, this investment leads to the
deterioration of the pro¯t of the ¯rm that did not undertake the project yet,
i.e. D00 > D01. Finally, the 'catch-up' investment made by the lagging ¯rm
enhances its pro¯t, so D11 > D01, but, at the same time, it reduces the pro¯t
3Alternatively, the risk neutrality assumption may be replaced by the replicating portfolio
argument.
4of the ¯rst mover, so that D11 < D10: The last inequality implies that there are
negative network externalities among the ¯rms.4
The investment opportunity is assumed to last forever and the structure
of the associated payo® can only change as a result of the competitor's action.
Therefore, the opportunity can be modelled as a perpetual American option
with a payo® determined endogenously. Consequently, we denote the investment
cost of Firm i; i 2 f1;2g by Ii: Without loss of generality I1 is normalized to
I; which is the investment cost of the low-cost ¯rm, and I2 is set equal to ½I;
where ½ 2 [1;1):
Finally, we assume that the initial realization of the process underly-
ing both ¯rms' pro¯ts is low enough, so that an immediate investment is not
optimal.5
3 Value Functions and Investment Thresholds
There are three possibilities concerning the timing of Firm i's investment
relatively to the decision of the competitor (Firm j). First, Firm i may invest
before Firm j does and, therefore, become the leader. Alternatively, Firm j
may invest sooner and Firm i becomes the follower. Finally, Firm i and Firm j
may invest simultaneously.
In this section we establish the payo®s associated with the three sit-
uations described above. As in the standard approach used to solve dynamic
games, we analyze the problem backwards. First, we derive the optimal strat-
egy of the follower, who takes the strategy of the leader as given. Subsequently,
we analyze the decision of the leader. Finally, the case of joint investment is
discussed.
3.1 Follower
Consider an investment decision of Firm i and de¯ne ¿j to be the moment in
time at which its competitor (Firm j) invests as the leader. Firm i will undertake
the investment when pro¯ts are su±ciently large, i.e. when xt exceeds a certain
threshold level denoted by xF
i . Determining xF
i is equivalent to ¯nding the
optimal option exercise strategy. At xt, where t ¸ ¿j, the value of Firm i as the
4Mason and Weeds [15] allow for D11 > D10 to re°ect the positive network externalities
that can arise among the competitors. In our setting (¯rms already compete in a product
market) such an assumption would be more di±cult to justify. Moreover, D10 > D11 does
not preclude the presence of positive network externalities among the ¯rms' customers (for
example, the pro¯ts generated by MicrosoftCorp. in the o±ce software segment are not likely
to be positively a®ected by technological improvements made by Corel).
5Immediate investment is optimal in case of a su±ciently high initial realization of the
stochastic process. Then mixed strategies equilibria can occur, as discussed for identical ¯rms
in Huisman and Kort [9].
5follower equals
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(r ¡ ®) ; (5)




2¯ (¯ ¡ 1) + ®¯ ¡ r = 0: (6)
The ¯rst integral in (3) corresponds to the present value of pro¯ts obtained
before the investment is undertaken. The second part of (3) re°ects the present
value of pro¯ts after the investment is made minus the associated sunk cost.
The value of the ¯rm as well as the optimal investment threshold can
be calculated explicitly by applying the well-known standard dynamic program-
ming methodology (see Dixit and Pindyck [3]). By solving the Bellman equation
with corresponding value-matching, smooth-pasting and no-bubbles conditions,

















if xt · xF
i ;
xtD11
r¡® ¡ Ii if xt > xF
i ;
(7)
The interpretation of (7) is as follows. The ¯rst row is the present value of pro¯ts
when the follower does not invest immediately. The ¯rst term is the payo® in
case the follower refrains from investing forever, whereas the second term is the
value of the option to invest. The second row corresponds to the present value
of enhanced cash °ows resulting from immediate investment minus its cost.
6It is worth pointing out that the Marshallian investment threshold, xF M
i , which is based







As explained in Dixit and Pindyck [3], the di®erence between xF
i and xFM
i re°ects the value




Following a similar reasoning as in the previous subsection, we determine
the payo® of Firm i when it invests ¯rst, thus Firm i is the leader. Then the


















The ¯rst two components of (8) correspond to the present value of the leader's
pro¯ts realized until the moment of the follower's investment net of the leader's
sunk cost. The second integral corresponds to the discounted perpetual stream
of pro¯ts obtained after the investment of the follower.
Using the results of the follower problem, we can express the value of

















if x¿i · xF
j ;
x¿iD11
r¡® ¡ Ii if x¿i > xF
j :
(9)
The ¯rst row of (9) is the net present value of pro¯ts before the follower made
the investment minus the present value of future pro¯ts lost due to the follower's
investment. The second row corresponds to the net present value of pro¯ts in a
situation where it is optimal for the follower to invest immediately.
3.3 Simultaneous Investment
It is possible that the ¯rms, despite the asymmetry in the investment cost,
decide to invest simultaneously. The value function of Firm i investing at its
optimal threshold simultaneously with Firm j is
V
S




































(r ¡ ®): (12)
7Expression (10) is interpreted analogously to (3) and (8). Consequently, the


















if xt · xS
i ;
xtD11
r¡® ¡ Ii if xt > xS
i ;
(13)
The second row equals the value of Firm i when the simultaneous investment
is made immediately. In such a case, we denote the value of Firm i by V J
i (¢):
From (12) it can be seen that xS
i di®ers among the ¯rms. As it is shown in
the next section, this divergence does not preclude the simultaneous investment
strategy.
4 Equilibria
There are three types of equilibria that can occur in the choice of strate-
gies, namely the preemptive, sequential and simultaneous equilibrium. In this
section we discuss the characteristics of each type of equilibrium and present
the conditions under which each of them occurs.
4.1 Preemptive Equilibrium
The ¯rst type of equilibrium we consider is the preemptive equilibrium.7
It occurs in the situation in which both ¯rms have an incentive to become the
leader, i.e. when the cost disadvantage of Firm 2 is relatively small. Therefore,
Firm 1 has to take into account the fact that Firm 2 will aim at preempting
Firm 1 as soon as a certain threshold is reached. This threshold, denoted by
xP
21, is the lowest realization of the process xt for which Firm 2 is indi®erent
between being the leader and the follower. Formally, xP
21 is the smallest solution
to
»2 (xt) = 0; (14)
where »i (xt) is de¯ned as
»i (xt) = V
L




i (xt) and V L
i (xt) are given by (7) and (9), respectively. As a conse-

















(r ¡ ®): (16)
7For an elaborate treatment of this type ofequilibrium the reader is referred to Fudenberg
and Tirole [4].
8Figure 1 shows an example of the ¯rms' payo®s associated with being
the leader, both investing at Firm 1's optimal simultaneous investment thresh-
old and both investing immediately. The follower payo® of Firm i is set as a
reference level.
























































































Figure 1. The relative (to the follower value) value functions of Firm i, i 2 f1;2g,
as the leader, V L
1 ¡ V F
1 , in case of optimal simultaneous investment, V S
1 ¡ V F
1 ,
and when simultaneous investment is made immediately , V J
1 ¡ V F
1 , for the set of
parameter values: ½ = 1:2; r = 0:05; ® = 0:015; ¾ = 0:1; I = 100; D00 = 0:5;
D10 = 1:5; D01 = 0:25; and D11 = 1.
Firm 1 invests as soon as the process reaches the smaller of two values:
xP
21 at which Firm 2 is indi®erent between being the leader and the follower, and
xL
1 at which it is optimal for Firm 1 to invest given that Firm 2 does not invest
until xL
1 is reached. It can be seen in Figure 1 (right) that to the left of xP
21 the
value of Firm 2 as the leader is lower than the value as the follower, while to
the right the opposite is true. Consequently, Firm 1 uses the fact that Firm 2
has no incentive to invest before xP
21 and preempts it by just an instant. For ½
tending to 1, i.e. when ¯rms become symmetric, xP
21 gets closer to the Firm 1's
preemption point, xP
1 , at which Firm 1 itself is indi®erent between being the
leader and the follower.
The presence of cost asymmetry implies the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Firm 1 extracts a relative surplus from becoming the leader vs.




























Proof. The proof directly follows from the de¯nition of the preemption









The sequential equilibrium occurs when Firm 2 has no incentive to become
the leader, i.e. when (14) does not have a real solution. In this case, Firm 1
9simply maximizes the value of the investment opportunity, what always leads
to investment at the optimal threshold xL
1 : In other words, Firm 1 acts as if it
had exclusive rights to invest in a pro¯t-enhancing project. Figure 2 describes
the ¯rms' payo®s corresponding to the sequential investment equilibrium.























































































Figure 2. The relative (to the follower value) value functions of Firm i, i 2 f1;2g,
as the leader, V L
1 ¡ V F
1 , in case of optimal simultaneous investment, V S
1 ¡ V F
1 ,
and when simultaneous investment is made immediately , V J
1 ¡ V F
1 , for the set of
parameter values: ½ = 1:4; r = 0:05 ; ® = 0:015; ¾ = 0:1; I = 100; D00 = 0:5;
D10 = 1:5; D01 = 0:25; and D11 = 1.
From Figure 2 (right) it can be concluded that Firm 2 is never better o® by
becoming the leader compared to being the follower. Therefore Firm 1 does not
need to take into account the possibility of being preempted by Firm 2. As a
result, Firm 1 is able to invest at its unconditional threshold, xL
1 (see Figure 2,
left diagram). At xL
1 the value of the investment opportunity smooth-pastes to
the net present value of incremental bene¯ts from making the investment (cf.
Dixit and Pindyck [3]). As in the previous case, Firm 2 invests at its follower
threshold xF
2 :







¯ ¡ (D11 ¡ D01)
¯




that separates the regions of the preemptive and the sequential equilibrium. For
½ < ½¤ Firm 1 needs to take into account possible preemption by Firm 2, whereas
½ ¸ ½¤ implies that ¯rms always invest sequentially at their optimal thresholds.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, Proposition 2 states that there is a cut-o® level for the cost
disadvantage of Firm 2 above which Firm 1 can act as a monopolist in exercising
its investment option.
104.3 Simultaneous Equilibrium
Another type of equilibrium is the simultaneous (or: joint investment) equi-
librium. In this case, the ¯rms invest at the same point in time. Figure 3 depicts
both ¯rms' payo®s associated with the simultaneous equilibrium.






















































































Figure 3. The relative (to the follower value) value functions of Firm i, i 2 f1;2g,
as the leader, V L
1 ¡ V F
1 , in case of optimal simultaneous investment, V S
1 ¡ V F
1 ,
and when simultaneous investment is made immediately , V J
1 ¡ V F
1 , for the set of
parameter values: ½ = 1:1; r = 0:05; ® = 0:015; ¾ = 0:1; I = 100; D00 = 0:5;
D10 = 1:25; D01 = 0:25; and D11 = 1. The set of input parameters results in the
optimality of a simultaneous investment at xS
1 .
In the simultaneous investment equilibrium one of the ¯rms has to adopt
a strategy that does not optimize its payo® unconditionally (since the optimal
joint investment thresholds di®er). Since the optimalthreshold of Firm 1is lower
than of Firm 2, the only candidate for a simultaneous investment threshold is
xS
1 ; de¯ned by (12). For simultaneous investment to occur, the payo® of Firm
1 associated with being the leader has to be lower than the payo® resulting
from simultaneous investment. Otherwise, Firm 1 will invest either at xL
1 or
at xP
2 (depending on the level of cost asymmetry). Moreover, Firm 2's follower
threshold must be lower than xS
1: In other words, Firm 2 has to ¯nd it more
pro¯table to respond to Firm 1's investment at xS
1 immediately than to wait.
Otherwise, Firm 2 would invest as the follower at xF
2 : It turns out that wherever
it is optimal for Firm 1 to invest simultaneously, Firm 2 prefers simultaneous
investment to being the follower (see the proof of Proposition 3 below).
In the subsequent section we analyze under which circumstances the
simultaneous equilibrium occurs.
4.4 Conditions for Equilibria
The occurrence of a particular type of equilibrium is determined by the
relationship between the relative payo®s, which in turn depend on the level of
cost asymmetry, ¯rst-mover advantage and market parameters such as volatility,
11the growth rate and the interest rate. From Proposition 1 we already know
the cut-o® value of the cost asymmetry that separates the preemptive and the
sequential equilibrium. Now, we concentrate on determining the region in which
the simultaneous equilibrium occurs. In order to do so, let us de¯ne
³i (xt) = V
S
i (xt) ¡ V
L
i (xt): (19)
³i (xt) can be interpreted as the change in Firm i's value associated with re-
fraining from an immediate (at xt) investment as the leader in favor of the
simultaneous investment strategy. If the minimum of ³1 (xt) on the interval
[x0;xF
1 ] is larger than zero, the change is positive, and thus a simultaneous equi-
librium occurs. In other words, the simultaneous equilibrium requires that Firm
1 is always better o® by investing jointly at its optimal threshold xS
1 compared
to becoming the leader.8 Otherwise, either the sequential or the preemption
equilibrium occurs.
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that determines the regions of the simultaneous and the sequential/preemptive
investment equilibria. For ½ < ½¤¤ the resulting equilibrium is of the joint invest-
ment type, whereas for ½ ¸ ½¤¤ the sequential/preemptive investment equilibrium
occurs.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 implies that for a relatively high degree of asymmetry between
¯rms (for a given set of Dijs and ¯), simultaneous investment is not optimal and
either a sequential or preemption equilibrium occurs. Moreover, there exists a
set of parameter values for which simultaneous investment is not optimal even
when the ¯rms are symmetric. In this case ½¤¤ is equal to 1. We present an
illustration of when the resulting equilibria occur in a two-dimensional graph.
In Figure 4 we depict the investment strategies as a function of the ¯rst-mover
advantage, D10=D11, and the investment cost asymmetry, ½.
8Strictly speaking, the equilibrium with sequential/preemptive investment still exists in
this case but is Pareto-dominated by the simultaneous entry equilibrium (cf. Fudenberg and
Tirole [4]).
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Figure 4. The regions of sequential , preemptive and joint investment equilibria for
the set of parameter values: r = 0:05; ® = 0:015; ¾ = 0:1; D00 = 0:5; D01 = 0:25;
and D11 = 1:
When the investment cost asymmetry is relatively small and there is no
signi¯cant ¯rst-mover advantage, the ¯rms invest jointly (a triangular area in
the south-west). When the ¯rst-mover advantage becomes signi¯cant, Firm 1
prefers being the leader to investing simultaneously. This results in the preemp-
tion equilibrium (area in the south-east). Finally, if the asymmetry between
¯rms is signi¯cant (for the set of parameter values in the upper part of the
Figure 4), the ¯rms invest sequentially and Firm 1 can act as a monopolist.
5 Cost Asymmetry and Value of the Firm
In this section we discuss the impact of the degree of investment cost
asymmetry on the value of each ¯rm and, in particular, on the net present
value (NPV) of the investment opportunities. We show that, in the presence
of strategic interactions, the relationship between the magnitude of the invest-
ment cost asymmetry and the value of the ¯rm is, in general, discontinuous and
non-monotonic.
In the absence of strategic interactions among the ¯rms the value-
asymmetry relationship is relatively straightforward. An increase in the in-
vestment cost of Firm 2 a®ects its value via i) a higher present value of the
investment expenditure that has to be incurred and ii) a delay in the optimal
timing of investment which results in postponing the moment of the pro¯t °ow
increase. Consequently, the value of Firm 2 decreases monotonically in ½. Con-
versely, the value of Firm 1 remains una®ected by a change in ½ since the ¯rms
do not interact with each other.
Introducing competition changes the way the asymmetry a®ects the
values of both ¯rms. In such a case, the value of Firm 2 is a®ected not only by
an increase in its investment cost but also by the fact that Firm 1 can ¯nd it
optimal to revise its reaction curve in response to the changing characteristics of
13Firm 2. Consequently, the value of Firm 2 will be also a®ected by the change of
Firm 1's investment timing in°uencing cash °ow of the former. We illustrate the
impact of strategic interactions with an example in which parameter values are
chosen in such a way that all three types of equilibria are possible (cf. Figure 4).
The ¯rms' values resulting from their optimal strategies are depicted in Figure
5 below.
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Figure 5
Figure 5. The value of Firm i (Vi) corresponding to the regions of the joint
investment, preemptive and sequential equilibria for the set of parameter values: r =
0:05; ® = 0:015; ¾ = 0:1; D00 = 0:5; D01 = 0:25; D10 = 1:33; D11 = 1, I = 100
and xt = 4.
The lowest degree of asymmetry between the ¯rms corresponds to the si-
multaneous investment equilibrium. In the simultaneous equilibrium the out-
come closely resembles the case where the strategic interactions are absent. A
marginal increase in ½ does not a®ect the value of Firm 1 and has a negative
impact on the value of Firm 2.
As ½ increases, the sequential investment becomes more attractive for
Firm 1 because of the increasing Firm 2's follower threshold. This means that
Firm 2 will invest later so that Firm 1's sequential investment pro¯t goes up.
Consequently, for ½ exceeding ½¤¤, Firm 1 would optimally invest at its leader
threshold xL
1 . However, Firm 2 anticipates this and, since its leader value at xL
1
is larger than its follower value, it is willing to invest an instant before Firm 1
does. In such a situation the shift in Firm 1's reaction curve is discontinuous
and a preemption equilibrium resulting in lower values of both ¯rms occurs.
The implication is that a marginal increase in the investment cost of Firm 2
that changes the equilibrium from simultaneous to preemptive, results in both
¯rms' payo®s jumping downward.
Once the ¯rms are in the preemption region, the values of both ¯rms
increase in ½. The at ¯rst sight surprising positive relationship between Firm
2's investment cost and its value is caused by the fact that increasing ½ makes
Firm 2 a 'weaker' competitor. This implies that the preemption threat of Firm 2
14declines in the investment cost asymmetry, so that xP
21 increases with ½. There-
fore, Firm 1 invests later, and this is bene¯cial for the cash °ow of Firm 2 since
it can enjoy a higher cash °ow for a longer period. In this case, the non-strategic
and strategic e®ects work in the opposite direction and the latter dominates. As
far as Firm 1 is concerned, its value increases because its investment threshold
moves closer to xL
1 . Moreover, it bene¯ts from the delayed investment of Firm
2.
When the asymmetry between the ¯rms reaches the critical level ½¤,
above which it is not optimal anymore for Firm 2 to become the leader, the
sequential equilibrium occurs. Upon the switch to the sequential equilibrium
the values of both ¯rms jump upward. This jump is in both cases caused by
the discontinuous change, from xP
21 to xL
1 , of Firm 1's investment threshold. By
investing at xL
1 Firm 1 maximizes its value, and lets Firm 2 enjoy a higher cash
°ow for a longer period.
In the sequential equilibrium region the changes in the ¯rms' values
result entirely from the sunk cost asymmetry and its impact on Firm 2's in-
vestment timing. Consequently, Firm 1 bene¯ts from the delayed investment
of Firm 2 and the value of the latter decreases for the same reason as in the
non-strategic case.
In order to provide better intuition about the nature of the non-monotonic
relationship between the value of the ¯rm, Vi, and the investment cost asymme-
try, ½, we decompose Vi into three components. First, we calculate the expected
value of discounted future pro¯ts in case no investment is made, which re°ects
the value of assets in place, A=Pi. Further, we derive the value of the ¯rm's own
investment opportunity given that the other ¯rm does not invest, PV GOO
i , and
the impact of the competitor's investment on the ¯rm's pro¯ts, PV GOC
i . The
sum of PV GOO
i and P VGOC
i can be interpreted as the strategic NPV of the
investment opportunity of Firm i.
Table 1a contains the decomposition of Firm 1's value for di®erent levels
of the cost-asymmetry.
½ 1:1 1:15 1:2 1:25 1:33 1:5
A=P1 57:14 57:14 57:14 57:14 57:14 57:14
P VGOO
1 14:19 15:14 17:16 18:15 18:15 18:15
P VGOC
1 ¡8:58 ¡12:17 ¡11:51 ¡10:91 ¡10:05 ¡8:57
V1 62:75 60:12 62:80 64:39 65:24 66:72
½¤ = 1:222 ½¤¤ = 1:124
Table 1a. Decomposition of Firm 1's value into the expected present value of the
perpetual cash °ow stream from assets in place, A=P1, the option to invest, P VGOO
1 ,
short the competitor's option to invest and the value reduction due to the competitor's
investment, PV GOC
1 , for the set of parameter values r = 0:05; ® = 0:015; ¾ = 0:1;
D00 = 0:5; D01 = 0:25; D10 = 1:33; D11 = 1; and I = 100. The value of the ¯rm,
V1, equals A=P1 + PV GOO
1 + PV GOC
1 .
From Table 1a a number of conclusions can be drawn. First, we notice that
the value attributed to assets in place does not change with the investment cost
15asymmetry. This is understandable since the existing production assets of the
¯rms are identical. Second, the value of Firm 1's investment opportunity rises
with ½. This re°ects the fact that the growing competitive advantage allows
Firm 1 to keep its investment strategy closer to the unconditional optimum, xL
1
(at which the value of P V GOO
1 in the example equals 18:15). Consequently, the
only source of non-monotonicity is the interaction of Firm 2's investment deci-
sion with Firm 1's pro¯t (see PV GOC
1 in Table 1a). When the cost-asymmetry
becomes larger, i.e. when ½ ¸ ½¤¤ = 1:124, then Firm 1 has no longer an
incentive to wait until the optimal simultaneous threshold is reached and is
aiming at preempting Firm 2. As discussed above, the resulting preemption
game deteriorates both ¯rm's payo®s and, as a direct consequence, their values.
Table 1b contains an analogous decomposition of the value of Firm 2.
½ 1:1 1:15 1:2 1:25 1:33 1:5
A=P2 57:14 57:14 57:14 57:14 57:14 57:14
P VGOO
2 13:45 11:94 11:29 10:70 9:80 7:88
P VGOC
2 ¡8:58 ¡18:25 ¡15:85 ¡12:67 ¡12:67 ¡12:67
V2 62:01 50:83 52:59 55:18 54:61 52:36
½¤ = 1:222 ½¤¤ = 1:124
Table 1b. Decomposition of Firm 2's value into the expected present value of the
perpetual cash °ow stream from assets in place, A=P2, the option to invest, P VGOO
2 ,
short the competitor's option to invest and recapture the part of the market share,
P VGOC
2 , for the set of parameter values r = 0:05; ® = 0:015; ¾ = 0:1; D00 = 0:5;
D01 = 0:25; D10 = 1:33; D11 = 1; and I = 100. The value of the ¯rm, V2, equals
A=P2 + PV GOO
2 + PV GOC
2 .
Upon analyzing Table 1b it can be concluded that increasing investment cost
asymmetry has two e®ects on the value of Firm 2. First, it results in the drop
in the value of Firm 2's investment opportunity, PV GOO
2 . This relationship is
monotonic irrespective from the type of the prevailing equilibrium and results
from the increase in the investment expenditure that has to be incurred. Second,
it in°uences the way the competitor's option to invest, PV GOC
2 , a®ects the
value of the ¯rm. In the region of the preemptive equilibrium, i.e. for ½ 2
[1:124;1:222], the value of Firm 2 lost due to the exercise of the investment
opportunity by Firm 1, PV GOC
2 , is inversely related to the investment cost
asymmetry. In other words, when Firm 2's cost becomes higher, the investment
of its competitor has a smaller negative impact on its value since the competitor
invests later. This is the result of the strategic e®ect of the marginal increase
in investment cost, via PV GOC
2 , which is stronger than the direct e®ect of the
increase in ½ on the net present value of the project, P VGOO
2 .
So far, we considered the impact of a di®erence in the investment cost on
the value of the ¯rms. We have shown that there exists a non-monotonic and
discontinuous relationship between the cost asymmetry and the ¯rms' values
resulting from the switches among the di®erent types of equilibrium strategies.
In the next section we discuss the impact of ½ on social welfare by showing how
particular types of strategies a®ect consumer surplus.
166 Welfare Analysis
In order to assess the desirability of policies a®ecting the ¯rms' access
to new market segments and technologies, we investigate how investment cost
asymmetry a®ects social welfare. The investment cost that has to be incurred
by the ¯rm can be in°uenced by the regulator, for instance, via ¯scal measures,
governmental guarantees resulting in a lower cost of capital, a di®erent treat-
ment of foreign vs. domestic investors, and the possibility of in°uencing the
speed of knowledge spillovers.9
Desirability of such a policy can be measured by the way it a®ects social
welfare, which is the sum of the consumer surplus and the ¯rms' values.10 Since
in the previous sections we already established the ¯rms' payo®s, here we begin
the analysis with deriving the consumer surplus. Subsequently, we discuss how
this surplus is in°uenced by the ¯rms investment strategies. After having done
this, we are ready to present the relationship between the investment strategies
and social welfare. Finally, we provide some conclusions.
In order to derive the consumer surplus, we specify the way investment
is bene¯cial to the consumers. To do so, we introduce a simple setting in which
after the investment Firm i is o®ering a product of quality b1 > b0, where b0
denotes the initial quality of the product. As long as the ¯rms o®er the same
quality bk, k 2 f0;1g, they compete µ a la Cournot, whereas after making the
investment ¯rst, Firm 1 achieves a Stackelberg advantage in the di®erentiated
product market. The Cournot outcome is restored after Firm 2 has invested.
Then both ¯rms compete in the market with a higher quality.





(µs;mbk ¡ ps;kl) e¡rsds
¸
; (21)
where µt;m is a time-varying consumer-speci¯c parameter that is uniformly dis-
tributed over the interval [0;At]; and pt;kl is the time t price of the product of
quality bk while the product o®ered by the other ¯rm is of quality bl. Parameter














where ®;¾ and dwt are the same as in (1). It is useful to observe (by applying
Ito's lemma) that A2
t can be replaced by xt since it exactly follows the process
(1).
Let us derive the expressions for the instantaneous consumer surplus,
denoted by cst;kl, where again k and l relate to the quality o®ered by the ¯rms.
9For instance, lowering the cost of capital via a third-party guarantee is documented by
Kleimeierand Megginson [8]. They ¯nd thatin the sample of 1,803 syndicated project¯nance
loans an average reduction of the spread due to the guarantees amounts to 43 basis points.
10Tirole [20], Ch. 5-8, provides an excellent introduction to oligopoly theory.
17We have to consider three cases. In the ¯rst case only quality b0 is provided.
In the second case one ¯rm provides quality b0 and the other b1 and, ¯nally,
both ¯rms o®er b1: In the ¯rst and third case maximizing the ¯rm's pro¯ts and




(Pt;k (q) ¡ pt;kk)dq =
1
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where Qt = 2qt;kl is the total quantity o®ered, qt;kl and pt;kl are the equilibrium
time t quantity and price of the product of quality bk, respectively, where the
other ¯rm's product is of quality bl, and Pt;k (q) is a time t inverse demand
function corresponding to the quality bk.
The formulation of cst;10 (the second mentioned case) is slightly more
involved and it corresponds to a Stackelberg equilibrium with second degree
price discrimination. Consequently, cst;10 consists of two components: the sur-
plus of consumers purchasing the good of quality b1 and the surplus of those
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To ¯nd out in what way the consumer surplus is related to the ¯rms'
investment strategies, we analyze the changes in the consumer surplus across the

















1 is given by (11). When the resulting equilibrium is of the preemption
type, the consumer surplus, CSP






































The consumer surplus in the sequential equilibrium is the same as (26), with






is replaced by T L
1 :
After taking into account that the ¯rms invest later in the simultaneous
equilibrium, a comparison of (25) and (26) enables us to formulate the following
proposition.
18Proposition 4 Under the preemptive/sequential equilibrium the consumer sur-
plus is always larger than in the joint investment equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
Consequently, from the consumers' viewpoint, the situation in which the
¯rms invest simultaneously is undesirable. This is easy to understand since in
this case the ¯rms invest later so that during a longer period of time the product
with a higher quality is not available.
Now, let us investigate socialwelfare, which equals, as mentioned earlier,
the consumer surplus plus the value of the ¯rms. In order to relate the latter
to the analyzed market, we can make the following substitution, where the














For a particular example, the consumer surplus and the ¯rms' values are de-
picted as functions of the asymmetry in the investment cost in Figure 6.
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Figure 6
Figure 6. The value of Firm i (Vi) and consumer surplus (CS) corresponding to
the regions of the joint investment, preemptive and sequential equilibria for the set of
parameter values: r = 0:05; ® = 0:015; ¾ = 0:1; b0 = 5; b1 = 7; I = 100; and
xt = 7.
From Figure 6 it can be concluded that low asymmetry in the investment
costs results in a relatively low consumer surplus and higher values of the ¯rms.
Increasing the asymmetry among the ¯rms, such that the simultaneous equilib-
rium is superseded by the preemption equilibrium, leads to a downward jump
in the ¯rms' values and, at the same time, to an upward jump in the consumer
surplus. As seen before, the decline in the ¯rms' values mainly results from
the need to incur the investment expenditure, I, earlier. The increase in the
19consumer surplus is the consequence of an earlier provision of the higher qual-
ity product. When the cost is large compared to the increase in the consumer
surplus associated with higher quality, it is optimal from a welfare perspective
to postpone the investment. Therefore, in such a case an increase in ½ leading
to a switch from simultaneous to preemption equilibrium has a detrimental ef-
fect on welfare. Conversely, when the required sunk cost is relatively small, the
resulting preemption equilibrium is socially desirable.
The impact of increasing ½ on social welfare is summarized in the fol-
lowing corollary.
Corollary 5 There exists a critical level of investment expenditure below which
social welfare is always larger in the preemptive/sequential equilibrium than in
the joint investment equilibrium.
Consequently, if the investment expenditure is small relatively to the
consumer surplus, social welfare is highest under the preemption equilibrium.
In this case, the loss in the ¯rms' values resulting from the preemption game is
outweighed by the e®ect on the consumer surplus of an earlier provision of the
high quality product. This implies that in the case of a relatively low investment
expenditure, a relative cost disadvantage of one of the competitors results in the
strategies yielding a socially preferred outcome.
Conversely, a relatively high investment expenditure implies the social
optimality of the simultaneous equilibrium. This results from the fact that the
simultaneous equilibrium is associated with a later investment outlay. Since the
increase in consumer surplus resulting from providing a higher quality product
earlier is not su±cient to fully compensate for the higher present value of an
early investment, postponing the investment is socially desirable. Therefore, in
the presence of a high sunk cost of the project, investment strategies resulting
in the simultaneous equilibrium maximize social welfare. This, in turn, implies
that the cost asymmetry is not desirable.
We conclude that an equal access of two ¯rms to a new market segment
does not maximize the consumer surplus. Moreover, after taking into account
the values of the ¯rms, it is not always socially desirable. If the ¯rms' investment
costs are not excessively high, the presence of asymmetry among them yields a
socially more desirable outcome.
However, it is important to notice that these conclusions do not carry
over to the case where the ¯rst-mover advantage is large, which would occur
when the product quality di®erence is higher. Then, as illustrated in Figure 4
the preemption equilibrium prevails even if ¯rms are symmetric. Consequently,
from a welfare perspective, asymmetry is not desirable even if the investment is
associated with a relatively low sunk cost.
207 Uncertainty and Investment Thresholds
From e.g. Dixit and Pindyck [3] it is known that in a non-strategic real
options framework increasing uncertainty leads to a higher optimal investment
threshold. As we show below, this observation also holds in strategic models
as long as the ¯rms' investment thresholds are solutions to the optimization
problem. The follower's threshold, the leader's threshold in the sequential equi-
librium, and the critical value triggering simultaneous investment satisfy this
condition. Conversely, in the preemptive equilibrium the leader (Firm 1) does
not invest at the threshold that solves its optimization problem, but instead it
invests at the follower's (Firm 2's) preemption point.








Dafter ¡ Dbef ore
(r ¡ ®); (29)
where Dafter and Dbefore are the deterministic contributions to the pro¯t func-












i.e. the optimal follower's threshold, optimal leader's threshold and the criti-
cal value corresponding to simultaneous investment increase with uncertainty.11
The impact of volatility on Firm 2's preemption point, xP
21, at which
Firm 1 invests, requires slightly more attention. Let us recall that xP
21 is the
smallest root of »2 (xt) = 0: Consequently, we calculate the derivative of »2 (xt)
with respect to the market uncertainty. The change of (15), calculated for Firm






















@(¾2) measures the direct in°uence of uncertainty on the








@ (¾2) re°ects the impact
on the net bene¯t of being the leader of the fact that the follower investment
threshold increases with uncertainty.















11Numerical simulations indicate that ½¤¤ increases and, respectively, ½¤ decreases in ¾:
This results in additional positive impact of uncertainty on the ¯rms' investment thresholds.
21Apparently, the joint impact of both e®ects is ambiguous. The ¯rst e®ect is
(32), which represents the simple value of waiting argument: if uncertainty is
large, it is more valuable to wait for new information before undertaking the
investment (Dixit and Pindyck [3]) As we have just seen, this also holds for the
follower. The implication for the leader of the follower investing later is that the
leader has a cost advantage for a longer time. This makes an earlier investment
of the leader more bene¯cial. This e®ect is captured by (33), which can thus be
interpreted as an increment in the strategic value of becoming the leader vs. the
follower resulting from the delay in the follower's entry. Obviously, the latter
e®ect is not present in the monopolistic/perfectly competitive markets, where
the impact of uncertainty is unambiguous.
However, it is possible to show that the direct e®ect captured by (32)
dominates, irrespective of the values of the input parameters.
Proposition 6 When uncertainty of the product market increases, the leader
investment threshold increases as well.
Proof. See Appendix.
Our conclusions concerning the relationship between the investment timing
and uncertainty are consistent with recent empirical evidence. The negative
investment-uncertainty relationship for ¯rms operating in an imperfectly com-
petitive environment is documented, for example, by Guiso and Parigi [7].
8 Conclusions
In this paper we analyze the impact on the ¯rms' optimal investment strate-
gies of the di®erence in the costs associated with their pro¯t-enhancing invest-
ments. Since the ¯rms operate in an imperfectly competitive market, the prof-
itability of each ¯rm's project is a®ected by the other ¯rm's decision to invest.
We show that when the asymmetry among ¯rms is relatively small and so is the
¯rst-mover advantage, the ¯rms invest jointly. When the ¯rst-mover advantage
is signi¯cant, the lower-cost ¯rm preempts the higher-cost ¯rm. In the situa-
tion where the asymmetry between ¯rms becomes su±ciently large, the ¯rms
exercise their investment options sequentially and their mutual decisions do not
a®ect each other directly.
Asymmetry has remarkable implications for the value of both ¯rms,
since the value-asymmetry relationship for both ¯rms is non-monotonic and
discontinuous. Consequently, we obtain a number of counter-intuitive results.
For reasonable parameter values, deepening the ¯rm's competitive disadvantage
due to a marginal rise in its irreversible cost may decrease the value of its com-
petitor. This situation results when a switch from simultaneous to preemptive
equilibrium occurs upon the marginal change in the cost asymmetry. Another
interesting e®ect of strategic interactions is present when the ¯rms are engaged
in the preemption game. Then increasing the extent to which the ¯rms is set
22at cost-disadvantage leads to an appreciation of its value due to the strategic
e®ect on the competitor's investment timing.
Moreover, there are signi¯cant welfare e®ects of strategic interactions
between the ¯rms. In an example where the investment increases product qual-
ity, we show that the relationship between cost asymmetry and social welfare
depends on the cost of investment. If it is relatively high and the ¯rst-mover
advantage is not too large, social welfare is maximized when none of the ¯rms
su®ers from competitive disadvantage. However, if the investment cost is low,
an increase of the consumer surplus resulting from the early investment in the
preemption equilibrium exceeds the loss of the ¯rms' joint value associated with
such an investment. Therefore, the preemption equilibrium, occurring when the
costs su±ciently di®er, is in this case desirable. This observation allows for the
conclusion that an equal access of competitors to a new technology or market
segment may not be socially optimal.
Finally, the impact of uncertainty is analyzed. Despite the presence of
strategic interactions, increasing uncertainty always results in a higher invest-
ment threshold. This holds not only for the optimal investment thresholds but
also for the case when the lower-cost ¯rm faces the threat of being preempted
by its higher-cost opponent.
9 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. The sequential equilibrium occurs when Firm 2
has no incentive to invest as the leader. Formally, this requires that »2 (xt) is
negative for all xt 2 [x0;xL
1 ). Therefore, we are interested in ¯nding a pair
(x¤;½¤) that satis¯es the following system of equations
(








In other words, we are interested in a point (x¤;½¤) in which Firm's 2 leader
function is tangent to the follower function. After substituting (7) and (9) into











































After multiplying both sides of the second equation in (35) by x¤
¯ ; subtracting







(r ¡ ®): (36)





















Rearranging (37) leads to the expression (18).
In the remaining part of the proof, we demonstrate that ½¤ > 1: It holds
that
½¤ > 1 ()
(D10 ¡ D01)
¯ ¡ (D11 ¡ D01)
¯
¯ (D10 ¡ D11)
¡ (D11 ¡ D01)
¯¡1 > 0: (38)
Consequently
(D10 ¡ D01)
¯ ¡ (D11 ¡ D01)
¯
¯ (D10 ¡ D11)




¯ ¡ (D11 ¡ D01)
¯ ¡ ¯ (D10 ¡ D11) (D11 ¡ D01)
¯¡1
¯ (D10 ¡ D11)
:(39)
By substituting
a = D11 ¡ D01; (40)
b = D10 ¡ D01; (41)
and rearranging, we conclude that (39) is equivalent to
a¯











After observing that b > a and a¯
¯(b¡a) > 0; we still have to prove that the second
factor of (42) is positive. Let us denote w = b
a and g (w) = w¯ ¡ 1 ¡ ¯w + ¯:
Consequently, we have




¯¡1 ¡ ¯ > 0: (44)
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. Firm 1 prefers simultaneous investment unless
for some xt its leader payo®, V L
1 (xt), exceeds the optimal joint investment
payo®, V S
1 (xt). Formally, simultaneous equilibrium occurs only if ³1 (xt) is






. Therefore, we are interested in ¯nding a pair
(x¤¤;½¤¤) that satis¯es the following system of equations
(








24In other words, we are interested in a point (x¤¤;½¤¤) in which Firm's 1 simul-
taneous investment function is tangent to its leader function. After substituting










































After multiplying both sides of the second equation in (46) by x¤¤
¯ ; subtracting






(r ¡ ®): (47)























Given that we only consider the case that ½¤¤ ¸ 1, rearranging (48) leads to the
expression (20).
In the remaining part of the proof we show that the optimality of the
simultaneous investment for Firm 1 implies that Firm 2 is better o® by investing
simultaneously as well. Consequently, we prove that as long as it is optimal for
Firm 1 to invest simultaneously, Firm 2's follower threshold is always smaller
than Firm 1's optimal joint investment threshold (since if this is true, then it is
always optimal for Firm 2 to invest immediately when Firm 1 invests). First,
we determine b ½ which solves
xF
2 (b ½) = xS
1 (b ½): (49)
For ½ < b ½ it holds that xF
2 (b ½) < xS
1 (b ½). After substituting (5) for Firm 2 and





Now, we show that b ½ > ½¤¤, i.e. that
D11 ¡ D01
D11 ¡ D00
¡ (D11 ¡ D01)
Ã
¯ (D10 ¡ D11)
(D10 ¡ D00)






c = D11 ¡ D00;
d = D10 ¡ D00;






















Let us denote z = d
c and h (z) = z¯ ¡ 1 ¡ ¯ (z ¡ 1) : Consequently, we have
h (1) = 0; and (53)
@h(z)
@z
= ¯z¯¡1 ¡ ¯ > 0; (54)
since z > 1 and ¯ > 1. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. Since T P
21 < TF
2 < TS
1 , subtracting the value
of consumer surplus in preemptive equilibrium from the value corresponding to















¡rs (css;11 ¡ css;00)ds > 0:
An identical reasoning can be applied while comparing the simultaneous equi-
librium with the sequential exercise strategy.
Proof of Proposition 6. The di®erence of Firm 2's payo®s as the leader
and the follower can be expressed as
»2 (xt) =




















We are interested in the direction in which uncertainty a®ects, xP
21, i.e. the
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26It is straightforward to observe that for su±ciently small xt (56) is positive.








1; xt 2 (0;x);








Since (in general) it is not possible to obtain an analytical formula for xP
21, we
evaluate the sign of the derivative (56) at such a realization of xt for which the
corresponding sign is the same as at xP
21. Consequently, we are interested in the
realization of xt that satis¯es the following two properties
»2 (x
¤) < 0 =) »2 (xt) < 0 8xt; and (58)
9xP
21 =) xP
21 < x¤: (59)

























(r ¡ ®) (61)
satis¯es (58) and (59). Property (58) can be veri¯ed by examining the de¯nition




Property (59) follows directly. Subsequently, we determine the sign of the deriva-














































+D11 ¡ D10 +
D11 ¡ D01
½¯¡1 ln ½:
27Positive '(½) for 8½ 2 [1;½¤]; where ½¤ is de¯ned by (18), would imply the
positive relationship between uncertainty and the leader threshold. First, we
show that '(½¤) is positive. Subsequently, we prove that
'(½
¤) > 0 =) '(½) > 0 8½ 2 [1;½
¤]: (64)
We prove that '(½¤) > 0 in three steps. First, we change the variables and
factorize the function '(½¤), what yields the product of two factors: one with
negative and one with unknown sign. Second, we show that the factor with
the unknown sign is increasing in the relevant variable. Finally, we show that
the value of the factor with a priori unknown sign approaches zero when the
underlying variable approaches the upper limit of its domain. The last two steps
imply that the sign of the analyzed factor is negative what is equivalent to the
positive sign of '(½¤).
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+D11 ¡ D10:
Now, we change the variables in order to simplify the expression for '(½¤).
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Since it always holds that
¡
(1¡ p)
(¯ ¡ 1) (1 ¡ p¯)
< 0; (70)
we are interested in the sign of the second factor of (69). Therefore, we de¯ne
e '(p;¯) ´ (¯ ¡ 1)
¡
1 ¡ p













Now, we determine the sign of the derivative of (71) calculated with respect to












































The ¯rst factor of (73) is always negative. After the following substitution
z = ¯
p¯¡1 (1 ¡ p)
1¡ p¯ ; (74)














In the last step we show that 8¯ lim
p"1
























¯ + ln p
¯¢
= 0: (78)



























































Consequently, substituting (78) and (79) into (77) yields
lim
p"1
e '(p;¯) = 0: (81)
(81) together with (76) imply that (71) is negative and, as a consequence, (65)
is positive.
Having proven the positive sign of '(½¤), now we show that (64) holds.
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where a and b are de¯ned by (40) and (41). De¯ning

















(¯ ¡ 1) p
½¯ < 0: (84)
This completes the proof.
Derivation of the consumer surplus and pro¯t functions. When both
¯rms o®er a product of quality, the resulting equilibrium is symmetric. The




















































































The observation that A2
t = xt allows for an immediate calculation of the con-
sumer surplus in terms of (1) and for an identi¯cation of the deterministic
contributions of the pro¯t functions.
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